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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between 
February 21, 2012 and August 28, 2012. This collection, written by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and 
criminal matters, and then by subject matter and court. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a 
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting 
point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 9 SETON 
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2012). 
 
 
CIVIL MATTERS 
Administrative Law .................................................................... 132 
Alternative Dispute Resolution ................................................... 134 
Antitrust ...................................................................................... 135 
Bankruptcy .................................................................................. 135 
Civil Procedure ........................................................................... 136 
Constitutional Law ...................................................................... 140 
Evidence ...................................................................................... 141 
Family Law ................................................................................. 141 
Federal Rules of Evidence .......................................................... 141 
Habeas Corpus ............................................................................ 142 
Immigration................................................................................. 143 
132 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:40 
Labor and Employment ............................................................... 145 
Landlord–Tenant ......................................................................... 147 
Statutory Interpretation ............................................................... 148 
Tax .............................................................................................. 148 
Torts ............................................................................................ 149 
CRIMINAL MATTERS 
Criminal Procedure ..................................................................... 149 
Environmental Law ..................................................................... 155 
Sentencing ................................................................................... 156 
 
CIVIL MATTERS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
Federal Communications Commission – Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (TCA): T-Mobile Central, LLC v. Charter Township of West 
Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2012). 
Issue One: The 6th Circuit addressed whether a township’s denial 
of a company’s application to build a cellular tower had the effect of 
prohibiting the company from providing wireless services, and as a 
result, violated 47 U.S.C  § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).  Id. 796.  The court noted 
that the 4th Circuit determined that “only a general, blanket ban on the 
construction of all new wireless facilities would constitute an 
impermissible prohibition of wireless services . . . .”   Id. at 805 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The 6th Circuit rejected the 4th Circuits 
approach, “which requires a blanket ban to trigger a violation of the 
statute . . . [because it] seem[ed] inconsistent both with the plain text of 
the statute as well as the broader goal of the TCA to promote 
construction of cellular towers.”  Id. at 805–06.  The 6th Circuit favored 
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 7th Circuits’ interpretation that “the clause is not 
restricted to blanket bans on cell towers and that the clause may, at times, 
apply to individual zoning decisions.”  Id. at 805 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that “the denial of a 
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single application can constitute a violation of . . . [the TCA].”  Id. at 
806. 
Issue Two: The 6th Circuit next addressed “whether the ‘significant 
gap’ in services focuses on the coverage of the applicant provider . . . or 
whether service by any other provider . . . is sufficient.”  Id. at 806.  The 
court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Circuits “have held that no 
‘significant gap’ exists if any ‘one provider’ is able to serve the gap area 
in question[,]” while the 1st and 9th Circuits have “rejected the ‘one 
provider rule’ and adopted a standard that considers whether a provider 
is prevented from filling a significant gap in its own service coverage.”  
Id. (original emphasis).  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 1st and 9th 
Circuits because of the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) 
“endorsement of the standards used by the 1st and 9th Circuits . . .[,]” 
and the FCC’s express rejection of the “blanket ban” approach.”  Id. at 
807.  The court disagreed with the “‘blanket ban’ approach adopted by 
the . . . [2nd, 3rd, and 4th] Circuits.”  Id.  Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded 
that “the denial of . . . [a company’s] application prevented it . . . from 
filling a significant gap in its own service coverage.”  Id. at 807–08. 
Issue Three: The 6th Circuit addressed “whether there are feasible 
alternate locations.”  Id. at 808. The court noted that 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 
7th Circuits have all adopted “versions of the ‘significant gap’ test.”  Id.  
The 2nd, 3rd, and 9th Circuits “require the provider to show that the 
manner in which it proposes to fill the significant gap in services is the 
least intrusive on the values that the denial sought to serve,” while the 1st 
and 7th Circuits “require a showing that there are no alternative sites 
which would solve this problem.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 
2nd, 3rd, and 9th Circuits in finding that the “least intrusive standard . . . 
is considerably more flexible than the ‘no viable alternatives’ standard as 
a carrier could endlessly have to search for different, marginally better 
alternatives.”  Id.  The court disagreed with the 1st and 7th Circuits 
because it considered their standard “too exacting.”  Id.  Thus, the 6th 
Circuit “adopt[ed] the ‘least intrusive standard.’”  Id. 
 
Judicial Review – Proper Consideration of Evidence: Brewes v. 
Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 682 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 
2012) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether courts evaluating denials of 
social security benefits should consider evidence that was not provided to 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) but was later provided to the 
Appeals Council.  Id. at 1161.  The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 
and 10th Circuits determined that evidence presented to the Appeals 
Council should be incorporated into the administrative record, even 
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thought it was not initially presented to the ALJ, while the 3rd, 6th, 7th, 
and 11th Circuits found that only evidence presented before the ALJ 
should be included as part of the final record.  Id.  The 9th Circuit agreed 
with the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, and 10th Circuits, finding that new evidence 
submitted to the Appeals Council, should be included as part of the 
record.  Id. at 1161–62.  The court disagreed with the 3rd, 6th, 7th, and 
11th Circuits because the Social Security Commissioner’s decision was 
only final after the Appeal Council’s decision and not after the ALJ’s 
decision.  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that district courts may 
consider evidence that is not before an ALJ but is later provided to the 
Appeals Council.   Id. at 1161. 
 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Arbitration – Proper Scope of Judicial Review: Reed v. Florida 
Metropolitan University Inc., 681 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2012) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether courts must “ensure that an 
arbitrator has a legal basis for his class arbitration determination, even 
while applying the appropriately deferential standard of review.”  Id. at 
645.  The court noted that the 2nd and 3rd Circuits had considered the 
issue, and both held the determination hinged on “whether the parties had 
submitted the class arbitration issue to the arbitrator and ‘whether the 
agreement or the law categorically prohibited the arbitrator from 
reaching that issue.’”  Id. at 644 & n.13 (internal citations omitted).  The 
5th Circuit pointed out that the primary thrust of the 2nd Circuit’s 
decision was “whether the district court applied the appropriate level of 
deference when reviewing the arbitration award.”  Id. at 645 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The 5th Circuit disagreed with the 2nd 
Circuit’s analysis and concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 
(2010), requires courts to “undertake an inquiry into the arbitrator’s 
reasoning,” which requires “some consideration of the arbitrator’s award 
and rationale.”  Id. at 645–46. 
 
Federal Arbitration Act – Definition of “Arbitration”: Evanston Ins. 
Co. v. Cogswell Properties, LLC, 683 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2012) 
The 6th Circuit addressed which source of law should provide the 
definition of “arbitration” under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  Id. 
at 693.  The court noted that the 5th and 9th Circuits determined that 
state law should control the definition, while the 1st and 10th Circuits 
found that federal law should apply.  Id.  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 
1st and 10th Circuits, finding it counter-intuitive to look to state law to 
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define a term in a federal statute on a subject as to which Congress has 
declared the need for national uniformity.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
Thus, the 6th Circuit held that federal law should control the definition of 
“arbitration” under the FAA.  Id. 
 
ANTITRUST 
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) – 
Jurisdiction: Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 
2012) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the causal nexus standard is the 
proper test for determining if a defendant’s conduct had a “direct” effect 
on domestic commerce within the context of the FTAIA.  Id. at 856.  The 
court noted that the 9th Circuit holds that “an effect is direct if it follows 
as an immediate consequence of the defendant’s . . . activity.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The 7th Circuit declined to adopt the 
9th Circuit’s “immediate consequence” test, and found more persuasive 
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division approach, “which takes 
the position that, for FTAIA purposes, the term ‘direct’ means only a 
reasonably proximate causal nexus.”  Id. at 856–57 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court reasoned that “[s]uperimposing the idea of 
‘immediate consequence’ on top of the full phrase results in a stricter test 
than the complete text of the statute can bear.”  Id. at 857.  Additionally, 
the court noted that the causal nexus standard ensures that the FTAIA 
will “exclude from the Sherman Act foreign activities that are too remote 
from the ultimate effects on U.S. domestic or import commerce.”  Id.  
Thus, the court adopted the Department of Justice’s causal nexus 
approach as the test for determining whether a defendant’s conduct has 
had a “direct” effect on domestic commerce.  Id. 
 
BANKRUPTCY 
Chapter Eleven – Debtor’s Duties and Benefits:   In re Bandi v. 
Becnel, 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012) 
The 5th Circuit addressed what the phrase “statement respecting the 
debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition” in  § 523(a)(2)(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code means for the purpose of deciding whether a party’s 
debt can be discharged after making false statements.  The court noted 
that the 8th and 10th Circuits determined “that statements within the 
meaning of that section are those that purport to present a picture of the 
debtor’s overall financial health.”  Id. at 677 (quoting Cadwell v. 
Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 714 (10th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks 
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omitted).  The 4th Circuit “held that a debtor’s false representation 
[about] certain property he owned . . . was a statement regarding the 
debtor’s financial condition and therefore dischargeable.”  Id.  The 5th 
Circuit agreed with the 8th and 10th Circuits and found that “the use of 
‘financial condition’ in the definition of ‘insolvent’ suggests that the term 
‘financial condition’ in § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) also relates to a debtor’s 
net worth or overall financial condition.”  Id. (quoting Cadwell, 427 F.3d 
at 707) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 5th Circuit concluded 
that “financial condition” meant “the general overall financial condition 
of an entity or individual, that is, the overall value of property and 
income as compared to debt and liabilities . . .” and that “a representation 
that one owns a particular residence or a particular commercial property 
says nothing about the overall financial condition of a person. . . .” Id. at 
676. 
District Court Sanctions – Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
9011: Klestadt & Winters, LLP v. Cangelosi, 672 F. 3d 809 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether more flexible jurisdictional 
principles regarding the appealability of bankruptcy orders apply to 
district court judges sitting in bankruptcy court.  Id. at 813.  The majority 
noted that a previous decision in the 9th Circuit supported it’s holding 
that the flexible jurisdictional principles do not apply in this situation.  
Id.  Additionally, the Court suggested that it was bound by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the jurisdictional restrictions under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 set forth in Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957), which 
precludes the Court from applying the more flexible approach.  The 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, and 5th Circuits agree that different rules regarding the finality 
of bankruptcy proceedings should not apply to appeals from a district 
court sitting in bankruptcy and a district court’s review of a bankruptcy 
court’s decision.  Id. 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Discovery Requests: EM Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201 (2nd Cir. 2012). 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether a district court has jurisdiction 
to order discovery judgments against a foreign sovereign.  Id. at 205.  
The 2nd Circuit disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s conclusion that a 
“district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign was 
insufficient to confer the power to order discovery from a person subject 
to the court’s jurisdiction that is relevant to enforcing a judgment against 
the sovereign.”  Id. at 209.  The court reasoned that “such a result is not 
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required by the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)]” and is 
inconsistent with 2nd Circuit precedent, which holds “that a district 
court’s jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign extends to proceedings to 
enforce a valid judgment.” Id.  Thus, the court held that a district court 
has jurisdiction to order discovery judgments against a foreign sovereign.  
Id. 
 
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Reverse Preemption: ESAB 
Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Insurance PLC, 685 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2012) 
The 4th Circuit addressed whether “the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
appl[ies] such that state law can reverse preempt federal law [such as the 
Convention or Convention Act] and invalidate a foreign arbitration 
agreement.”  Id. at 382.  The court noted that the 2nd Circuit held that 
because “the Convention is not self-executing, and therefore, relies upon 
an Act of Congress for its implementation,” pursuant to McCarran-
Ferguson Act, “state laws precluding arbitration of disputes with a 
delinquent insurer reverse preempt the Convention Act.”  Id. at 385.  
Conversely, according to the 5th Circuit, “even assuming the Convention 
was non-self-executing, reverse preemption did not apply.”  Id.  The 4th 
Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit in finding that “the Convention, not 
the Convention Act, . . . directs courts to enforce international arbitration 
agreements,” and because the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s text limits its 
scope to federal statutes, McCarran-Ferguson could not disrupt the 
application of traditional preemption rules. Id. at 384, 388.  The 4th 
Circuit reasoned that “McCarran-Ferguson is limited to legislation within 
the domestic realm” and must be read narrowly.  Id. at 388. Therefore, 
“even assuming Article II of the Convention is non-self-executing, the 
Convention Act, as implementing legislation of a treaty, does not fall 
within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”  Id.  Thus, the 4th 
Circuit concluded that under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the state law 
does not reverse preempt federal law.  Id. at 379. 
 
Qui Tam Actions – False Claims Act (FCA): Little v. Shell Exploration 
& Production Co., 690 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2012) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether “a federal employee, even one 
whose job it is to investigate fraud, [is] a ‘person’ under the FCA such 
that he may maintain a qui tam action.”  Id. at 284.  The court noted that 
the 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits determined that federal employees 
are persons under the FCA, while the 1st Circuit found “that at least 
some federal employees may not be qui tam claimants.”  Id. at 286.  The 
5th Circuit agreed with the 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits in finding 
that the plain language of the statute suggested that any person may bring 
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a suit and that the language about “private persons” was not meant to 
exempt government employees in general.  Id. at 288–89.  The court 
disagreed with the 1st Circuit because the express limitations in the 
statute implied “that Congress wished to limit the statute only as 
stated[,]” and the court does not have authority to create new exceptions.  
Id. at 287.  Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that federal employees are 
persons under the FCA and therefore may bring a qui tam action.  Id. at 
*2. 
 
Privileged Communications and Confidentiality – Attorney-Client 
Privilege: In re Pacific Pictures Corporation, 679 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 
2012) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether voluntary disclosure of 
privileged documents to third parties destroys attorney-client privilege 
when the third party is the federal government.  Id. at 1124.  The 8th 
Circuit has adopted a “selective waiver” theory, in which disclosure of 
privileged materials to the government for purposes of a separate and 
nonpublic investigation results in only a limited waiver of the attorney-
client privilege, while the D.C., Federal, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 
10th Circuits have rejected the “selective waiver” theory.  Id. at 1127.  
The 9th Circuit agreed with the majority of its sister circuits in finding 
that “selective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full 
disclosure to one’s attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance; 
it merely encourages voluntary disclosure to government agencies, 
thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended purpose.”  Id.  The 
court disagreed with the 8th Circuit’s reasoning that full waiver by 
voluntary disclosure to government may discourage corporations from 
consulting with independent outside counsel on pertinent issues for the 
protection of stockholders, finding this concern to be unjustified.  Id.  
Thus, the 9th Circuit rejected the “selective waiver” theory and held that 
documents that had been voluntarily disclosed to the federal government 
were no longer protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Id. at 1129. 
 
Removal of Cases – Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA): Frederick v. 
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co., 683 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2012) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a party seeking to remove a 
case under CAFA that has alleged an amount less than the jurisdictional 
minimum must prove the amount in controversy under the “legal 
certainty” standard or the “preponderance” standard.  Id. at 1246.  The 
court noted that the 9th and 3rd Circuits require “the party seeking 
removal . . . prove with ‘legal certainty’ that the amount in controversy is 
satisfied, notwithstanding the prayer for relief in the complaint.”  Id. 
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(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court further pointed out that the 
1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits subscribe to the preponderance 
standard, which requires that the “party seeking to remove under CAFA . 
. . establish the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the 
evidence regardless of whether the complaint alleges an amount below 
the jurisdictional minimum.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The 10th Circuit joined the majority of other circuits in adopting the 
preponderance standard, and posited that there is “no logical reason why 
we should demand more from a CAFA defendant than other parties 
invoking federal jurisdiction.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, the court concluded that “a defendant seeking to remove under 
CAFA must show that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 by 
a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. 
 
Statutory Time Bar – Truth In Lending Act: Rosenfield v. HSBC 
Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether one can properly rescind a 
contract within the Truth in Lending Act’s (TILA) three-year statutory 
time-bar by sending written notice of intent to rescind or by “asserting a 
defense of rescission during a Colorado Rule 120 Proceeding.”  Id. at 
1180–81.  The 3rd and 9th Circuits strictly applied the three-year 
statutory time-bar, holding that “rescission suits must be brought within 
three years from the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice 
of rescission was delivered within that three-year period.”  Id. at 1187 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that the 4th Circuit 
recently disagreed, stating that “a borrower must file a lawsuit within the 
three-year time period to exercise her right to rescind, as opposed simply 
to notifying the creditor.”  Id. at 1188 n.12.  The 10th Circuit joined the 
3rd and 9th Circuits in holding that “notice, by itself, is not sufficient to 
exercise (or preserve) a consumer’s right of rescission under TILA.”  Id. 
at 1188. 
 
Prudential Standing – Jurisdictional or Non-Jurisdictional: Grocery 
Manufacturer’s Association v. Environmental Protection Agency, 693 
F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether prudential standing is 
jurisdictional.  Id. at 174, 185.  The majority relied on D.C. Circuit 
precedent in holding that prudential standing is a jurisdictional issue, 
meaning that it is always before the court and cannot be waived.  Id. at 
175.  The dissent, however, posited that the majority’s holding “creates a 
deep and important circuit split on this important issue.”  Id. at 185 
(Kavanaugh, C.J., dissenting).  While noting that the “Supreme Court has 
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not yet directly addressed whether prudential standing is 
jurisdictional[,]” id. at 184, the dissent points to decisions of the 5th, 7th, 
9th, 10th, 11th, and Federal Circuit Courts, which all held prudential 
standing to be a non-jurisdictional issue, id. at 184–85.  Accordingly, the 
dissent reasoned that the weight of authority indicates that prudential 
standing is non-jurisdictional and that a defendant who fails to raise 
prudential standing forfeits the argument.  Id. at 185.  The majority, 
however, concluded that “[s]tanding under Article III is jurisidcitonal[,]” 
and “[i]f no petitioner has Article III standing, then this court has no 
jurisdiction to consider [the] petitions.”  Id. at 174. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
ADEA Preclusion – Equal Protection Claims: Levin v. Madigan, 692 
F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, precluded a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 equal protection claim.  Id. at 616.  The court noted that all other 
circuits considering the issue have decided “that the ADEA is the 
exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.”  Id.  The 7th Circuit, 
however, disagreed with the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits in 
finding a lack of “clear or manifest congressional intent” as to the 
ADEA’s preclusive effects.  Id. at 621.  The 7th Circuit compared the 
rights and protections granted under both the ADEA and § 1983 to 
determine whether the ADEA precludes a § 1983 claim.  Id.  First, the 
court explained that “an ADEA plaintiff may only sue his employer, an 
employment agency, or a labor organization,” while a § 1983 plaintiff 
“may file suit against an individual, so long as that individual caused or 
participated in the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights . . . [or] a government organization.”  Id.  The court also found 
relevant that “the ADEA expressly limits or exempts claims by certain 
individuals . . . [while] there are no such limitations for § 1983 equal 
protection claims.”  Id.  Finally, the court explained that “[w]ithout the 
availability of a § 1983 claim, a state employee . . . who suffers age 
discrimination in the course of his employment is left without a federal 
damages remedy” because “such [ADEA] claims are barred by Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity.”  Id.  Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded 
that “given these divergent rights and protections, the ADEA is not the 
exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment claims,” and that 
a § 1983 claim is not precluded by the ADEA.  Id. at 622. 
2012] Current Circuit Splits 141 
EVIDENCE 
Attorney-Client Privilege – Selective Waiver: In re Pacific Pictures 
Corp., 679 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) 
The 9th Circuit addressed the issue of “whether a party waives 
attorney-client privilege forever by voluntarily disclosing privileged 
documents to the federal government.”  Id. at 1124.  The court noted that 
the 8th Circuit determined that a “selective waiver” theory might allow a 
party to disclose documents to the government and not destroy the 
privilege, while every other circuit that has considered the theory has 
rejected it.  Id. at 1127.  The court agreed with the 3rd Circuit in finding 
that the “selective waiver” is “extending the privilege beyond its 
intended purpose.”  Id.  Thus the 9th Circuit concluded that “given that 
Congress has declined broadly to adopt a new privilege to protect 
disclosures of attorney-client privileged materials to the government,” 
the court would not overstep its boundaries and adopt the “selective 
waiver” theory.  Id. at 1128. 
 
FAMILY LAW 
Child Welfare Act – Case Plan Provisions: Henry A. v. Willden, 678 
F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2012) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether case plan provisions are 
enforceable through § 1983 of the Child Welfare Act (CWA).  Id. at 
1006.  The court noted that the majority of circuits hold that case plan 
provisions are enforceable through § 1983 of the CWA because such 
provisions contain sufficient “rights-creating language” described in 
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).  The 9th Circuit split from 
the 11th Circuit which held that case plan provisions cannot be enforced 
under a § 1983 cause of action.  Henry A., 678 F.3d at 1008.  The 9th 
Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits in finding that the 
unambiguous language of the CWA revealed a congressional intent to 
create a right enforceable under § 1983.  Id. at 1009.  Thus, the 9th 
Circuit concluded case plan provisions were enforceable through § 1983.  
Id. 
 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Fed. R. Evid. 501 – Settlement Negotiation Privilege: In re MSTG, 
Inc., 675 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
The Federal Circuit addressed whether “communications related to 
reasonable royalties and damages are protected from discovery based on 
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a settlement negotiation privilege.”  Id. at 1339.  The court recognized 
that the 6th Circuit invoked Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
“fashion a new privilege in patent cases that would prevent discovery of 
litigation settlement negotiations related to reasonable royalties and 
damages,” while the 7th Circuit declined to adopt a settlement privilege.  
Id. at 1342.  The Federal Circuit articulated several reasons for not 
adopting a settlement negotiation privilege and relied on factors 
identified by the Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 
(1996).  Id. at 1343.  The court determined that “failure to recognize a 
federal settlement privilege [would] not frustrate the purposes of any 
state legislation,” and that “Congress’s failure to adopt a settlement 
privilege supports our conclusion that no privilege for settlement 
negotiation should be recognized.”  Id. at 1343, 1345 (internal quotation 
marks omitted.  Thus, the Federal Circuit joined the 7th Circuit and 
concluded that “settlement negotiations related to reasonable royalties 
and damage calculations are not protected by a settlement negotiation 
privilege.”  Id. at 1348. 
 
HABEAS CORPUS 
Parole Hearings – Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 4210(b)(2) and 28 C.F.R. 
§ 2.52(c)(2): Edwards v. Dewalt, 681 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2011) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 4210(b)(2) 
mandates the Parole Commission “to conduct case-by-case hearings with 
notice to the parolees and an opportunity to be heard” when denying an 
award of credit for street time following the parolee’s commitment of an 
offense punishable by imprisonment.  Id. at 786.  The court noted that the 
9th Circuit held there to be such a mandate by treating the Commission-
established regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 2.52(c)(2), which require a parolee 
to forfeit “all street time if he is convicted of a new offense punishable 
by any term of imprisonment” while on parole, as an incorrect 
interpretation of the statute.  Id. at 785.  The 6th Circuit disagreed with 
the 9th Circuit’s interpretation, but instead found the Commission’s 
regulations to be a valid exercise of its delegated authority.  Id. at 786.  
The court found the statutory language, “the Commission shall 
determine,” as giving “the Commission . . . permi[ssion] to make its 
determination on an across-the-board basis, if in its discretion it decides 
to do so.”  Id.  It further reasoned that “even when a regulation purports 
to ‘interpret’ a statutory term, the regulation may serve as an exercise of 
properly delegated discretion.”  Id.  Thus, the court concluded that the 
Commission is not required to conduct case-by-case hearings, and may 
establish across-the-board that parolees who violate parole with an 
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offense punishable by imprisonment must forfeit street time.  Id. at 787–
88. 
 
IMMIGRATION 
Naturalization and Removal Proceedings – Immigration and 
Nationality Act: Gonzalez v. Aytes, 678 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “district courts have jurisdiction 
to review a denial of naturalization during the pendency of removal 
proceedings and may issue a declaratory judgment regarding the 
lawfulness of such denial.”  Id. at 258.  The court agreed with the 6th 
Circuit’s determination that a district court may not order the Attorney 
General to naturalize an alien who is subject to pending removal 
proceedings.  The court disagreed with the 2nd and 5th Circuits’ 
conclusions that this determination requires district courts to dismiss 
these cases.  Id.  The court reasoned that allowing declaratory relief 
“strikes a balance between the petitioner’s right to full judicial review as 
preserved by [8 U.S.C.A.] § 1421(c) and the priority of removal 
proceedings enshrined in [8 U.S.C.A.] § 1429.”  Id. at 259–60.   The 
court emphasized that creation of § 1421(c) evidences Congress’s intent 
to maintain a petitioner’s right to judicial review of a naturalization 
denial rather than vesting full authority to grant or deny a naturalization 
application with the Attorney General.  Id. at 260.  Further, the court 
reasoned that declaratory judgment regarding the lawfulness of a denial 
of naturalization permits the alien his or her day in court while not 
“upsetting” the priority of removal proceedings.  Id. at 261.  Thus, the 
3rd Circuit held that declaratory relief is appropriate in a district court’s 
review of a denial of naturalization during pending removal proceedings.  
Id. at 259. 
 
Discretionary Asylum Determinations – Immigration and 
Nationality Act: Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 
2012) 
The Fifth Circuit addressed whether the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adding “social 
visibility” and “particularity” as requirements to establish “membership 
in a particular social group,” such that the BIA’s decision did not warrant 
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Id. at 519.  The court noted that the 
1st, 2nd, 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits determined that the BIA’s 
“interpretations of what constitutes a ‘particular social group’ are entitled 
to deference.”  Id. at 520.   The court further observed that the 9th and 
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10th Circuits had addressed the narrower issue in the case at bar, and 
held that “individuals from Central America resisting gang activity . . . 
are not members of particular social groups.”  Id.  In contrast, the 3rd and 
7th Circuits declined to apply the BIA’s “social visibility” and 
“particularity” framework for “membership in a particular social group.”  
Id.  The 5th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th 
Circuits stating that it “d[id] not believe that the BIA’s interpretation 
incorporating the ‘particularity’ and ‘social visibility’ test is an 
impermissible construction of a statute that is decidedly vague and 
ambiguous.”  Id. at 521.  The court disagreed with the 3rd and 7th 
Circuits’ rejection of the BIA’s framework, but noted that “even the 
opinions in our sister circuits that reject the BIA’s framework do not 
necessarily support [defendant’s] argument,” because “a social group 
cannot be defined by its relationship to its persecutor alone or by the fact 
that its members face dangers in retaliation for the actions against the 
persecutor.”  Id. at 520.  Thus, the 5th Circuit held that “the BIA’s 
interpretation is . . . entitled to deference since agency interpretations are 
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id. at 521. 
 
Selection System – Revocation of Approval of Petitions: Mehanna v. 
United States Citizenship & Immigration Services, 677 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 
2012) 
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether section 1252 (a)(2)(B)(ii) [of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act] removed [the 6th Circuit’s] 
jurisdiction to review the [Attorney General’s or Secretary of Homeland 
Security’s] decision under section 1155 to revoke a visa petition” as an 
act of discretion.  Id. at 314.  The court noted that at least seven other 
circuits “have interpreted revocations of visa petitions under section 
1155 to be discretionary, while the 9th Circuit found that the “power to 
revoke a visa petition is not entirely within the Attorney General’s [or the 
Secretary’s] judgment or conscience because the ‘good and sufficient 
cause’ language constitutes a legal standard the meaning of which we 
retain jurisdiction to clarify.”  Id. at 315 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  The 6th Circuit agreed with the majority of the circuits 
in finding “[t]he statute, when read in its totality, plainly commits the 
decision of whether to revoke a visa petition to the discretion of the 
Secretary [or Attorney General].  Id.  The court disagreed with the 9th 
Circuit’s reading of the section stating that it would require “focusing on 
the ‘good and sufficient cause’ language to the exclusion of the word 
‘deems.’”  Id.  Thus the 6th Circuit concluded, “the Secretary’s decision 
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to revoke a visa petition under section 1155 is an act of discretion that 
Congress has removed from our review.”  Id. at 315. 
 
Discretionary Asylum Determinations – Immigration and 
Nationality Act: Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012) 
The 8th Circuit addressed whether the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adding “social 
visibility” and “particularity” as requirements to establish of 
“membership in a particular social group.”  Id. at 682 (Bye, J., 
concurring).  The court noted that the 3rd, 6th, and 7th Circuits 
determined that “social visibility” and “particularity” requirements were 
inconsistent with BIA precedent, and that the BIA failed to provide its 
rationale for their addition.  Id. at 685.  In contrast, the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 
9th Circuits upheld the BIA’s addition of the “social visibility” and 
“particularity” requirements, as well as the BIA’s authority to refine its 
definition of “particular social group.”  Id.  The 8th Circuit noted that it 
was bound by prior decisions in which it had adopted the findings of the 
1st, 2nd, 4th, and 9th Circuits that “‘persons resistant to gang violence’ 
are too diffuse to be recognized as a particular social group.”  Id. at 681.  
The court disagreed with the 3rd, 6th, and 7th Circuits that these 
individuals are perceived as a distinct group by society such that they 
“suffer from a higher incidence of crime than the rest of the population.”  
Id. at 680.  Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that it had no choice but to 
hold that the BIA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in requiring that 
a “particular social group” be “a discrete class of persons who would be 
perceived as a group by the rest of society.”  Id. at 682. 
 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) – Equitable 
Relief: CGI Technologies & Solutions, Inc. v. Rose, 683 F.3d 1113 (9th 
Cir. 2012) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether strict adherence to the terms of 
an ERISA plan that disclaims the application of traditional equitable 
defenses constitutes appropriate equitable relief.”  Id. at 1122 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that the 5th, 7th, 8th, and 
11th Circuits determined that, “in balancing the equities, simple contract 
interpretation that provides for full reimbursement per the plain terms of 
a plan that disclaims the application of traditional equitable defenses . . . 
constitutes appropriate equitable relief . . .[,]” while the 3rd Circuit 
found “that under § 502(a)(3), the district court, in granting appropriate 
equitable relief, may consider traditional equitable defenses 
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notwithstanding express terms disclaiming their application.”  Id. at 
1122–23 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 9th Circuit agreed with 
the 3rd Circuit in finding that there was “no indication in ERISA or in 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that Congress intended to limit relief 
under § 502(a)(3) to traditional equitable categories yet not limit relief by 
other equitable doctrines and defenses that were traditionally applicable 
to those categories.”  Id. at 1123 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
court disagreed with the 5th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits because it did 
“not see good reason in interpreting § 502(a)(3) to recede from the 
traditional broad powers of a court in equity.”  Id. at 1124.  Thus, the 9th 
Circuit concluded that “the parties may not by contract deprive the 
district court of its power to act as a court in equity in a § 502(a)(3) 
action.”  Id. 
 
Labor-Employment – Employee Retirement Income Savings Act 
(ERISA): Bilyeu v. Morgan Stanley Long Term Disability Plan, 683 
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2012) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a plan fiduciary can satisfy the 
requirements for an equitable lien by agreement if the “specifically 
identified property has been dissipated.”  Id. at 1095.  The court noted 
that the Supreme Court, in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services 
Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006), held that one of the “criteria for securing an 
equitable lien by agreement in an ERISA action” is that “the funds 
specifically identified by the fiduciary must be within the possession and 
control of the beneficiary.”  Id. at 1093 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court noted that the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 7th Circuits “have 
interpreted Sereboff[] [to mean] that a fiduciary can assert an equitable 
lien . . . even if the beneficiary no longer possesses the specifically 
identifiable funds.”  Id. at 1094.  The court acknowledged that the 5th 
Circuit has held that “[p]osession is key to awarding equitable restitution 
in the form of a constructive trust or equitable lien.” Id. at 1095 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   The court found the reasoning of the 1st, 3rd, 
6th, and 7th Circuits unpersuasive.  The 9th Circuit held that a fiduciary 
cannot “enforce an equitable lien against a beneficiary’s general assets 
when specifically identified funds are no longer in the beneficiary’s 
possession.”  Id. 
 
Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) – Irrebuttable Presumption of 
Complicated Pneumoconiosis: Bridger Coal Co. v. Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, 669 F.3d 
1183 (10th Cir. 2012) 
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The 10th Circuit addressed “whether equivalency determinations 
were necessary in applying the irrebuttable presumption of [complicated] 
pneumoconiosis set forth in § 921(c)(3) [of the BLBA] . . . .”  Id. at 
1189.  The court noted that the 4th Circuit determined that “§ 921(c)(3) 
implicitly requires an ‘equivalency determination,’ i.e., a claimant 
seeking to prove complicated pneumoconiosis under the ‘massive 
lesions’ clause of § 921(c)(3) must show that such lesions would show 
up as one-centimeter-or-greater opacities if detectable by chest x-ray.”  
Id. at 1187.  In contrast, the 11th Circuit found that “[i]t is sufficient if 
the claimant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
miner’s autopsy or biopsy results are consistent with a diagnosis of 
complicated pneumoconiosis under accepted medical standards.”  Id. at 
1188.  The 10th Circuit agreed with the 11th Circuit in finding that 
“[r]equiring ‘equivalency determinations’ in applying the § 921(c)(3) 
presumption is contrary to the plain language of the statute and, thus, 
inconsistent with congressional intent.”  Id. at 1194.  The court disagreed 
with the 4th Circuit as “the lack of similar language in another part of the 
statute indicates congressional intent not to require such 
determinations[,]” and “regardless of whether equivalency 
determinations are required, the ALJ is not relieved of its obligation 
[under § 923(b)] to consider all relevant evidence in making a benefits 
determination.”  Id.  Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that a claimant is 
only required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
“autopsy or biopsy results are consistent with a diagnosis of complicated 
pneumoconiosis under accepted medical standards.”  Id. at 1194. 
 
LANDLORD–TENANT 
Truth in Lending Act – Notification Requirement: Gilbert v. 
Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012) 
The 4th Circuit addressed “whether the borrower must file a lawsuit 
within three years after the consummation of a loan transaction to 
exercise her right to rescind, or whether the borrower need only assert 
the right to rescind through a written notice within the three-year period” 
under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).  Id. at 276.  The court noted that 
the 9th Circuit held that “rescission suits must be brought within three 
years from the consummation of the loan, regardless [of] whether notice 
of rescission is delivered within that three-year period.”  Id.  The 4th 
Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit because the plain language of the 
statute does not say “anything about the filing of a lawsuit,” and declined 
to implement such a requirement.  Id. at 277.  Thus, the 4th Circuit 
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concluded that a borrower need only notify a creditor of her rescission 
within a three-year period to exercise that right.  Id. 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The Lanham Act – Standard of Proof: Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. 
Paul, 684 F.3d 187 (1st Cir. 2012) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether “to equate fraud or willfulness 
with a heightened standard of proof” in Lanham Act cases.  Id. at 193.  
The court noted that the 3rd Circuit determined that a heightened burden 
of proof is necessary to demonstrate intent to deceive, while the 4th 
Circuit found that a preponderance of the evidence standard should be 
applied to the Lanham Act’s bad faith provisions.  Id. at n.7.  The 1st 
Circuit agreed with the 4th Circuit, and found that the application of a 
preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate.  Id.  The court 
disagreed with the 3rd Circuit as applying a heightened standard because 
the Lanham Act does not call for more than a preponderance standard.  
Id. at 193.  Thus, the 1st Circuit concluded that preponderance is the 
proper standard.  Id. 
TAX 
Foreign Tax Credit – Interpreting 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a): Entergy 
Corp. & Affiliated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
683 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2012) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether an American corporation is 
“entitled to a foreign income tax credit for its subsidiary’s payment of the 
United Kingdom’s Windfall Tax” under 26 U.S.C. § 901 and I.R.C. § 
901.  Id. at 233.  The court explained that under 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a) 
an American corporation is entitled to a tax credit for any amounts that a 
foreign government assesses against the corporation as a levy when such 
a levy satisfies “each of the realization, gross receipts, and net income 
requirements established by the regulation.”  Id. at 235 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court stated that the Windfall Tax met the 
realization and net income requirements, but the method for calculating 
the foreign tax makes unclear whether the levy satisfies the final 
regulatory requirement.  Id. at 236.  The court noted that the 3rd Circuit 
determined the United Kingdom’s Windfall Tax “fails at least the gross 
receipts requirement of the governing regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a) . 
. . .”  Id. at 237.  The 5th Circuit eschewed the 3rd Circuit’s analysis and 
noted that “the Windfall Tax is based on excess profits—realized income 
derived from gross receipts” minus deductions for substantial business 
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expenses.  Id. at 239.  Thus, the 5th Circuit held that the foreign levy 
satisfies the three net gain requirements for a foreign tax credit.  Id. 
TORTS 
Preemption – State Fraud-on-the-FDA Claim: Lofton v. McNeil 
Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals, 672 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2012) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether, under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 
(2001), a state fraud on the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) claim is preempted by federal law unless the FDA itself finds 
fraud.  Id. at 377.  The court noted that the 6th Circuit determined that 
state fraud-on-the-FDA provisions are preempted unless the FDA finds 
that fraud has been committed during the approval process, while the 2nd 
Circuit determined the applicable state fraud-on-the-FDA provision was 
distinguished from Buckman.  Id. at 377, 78.  The court also noted that 
the 6th Circuit, in requiring preemption under Buckman, determined that 
the state fraud-on-the-FDA provision at issue required proof that the drug 
manufacturer defrauded the FDA in conflict with the FDA’s duties, a 
violation of the Supremacy Clause.  Id. at 378, 80.  The court joined the 
6th Circuit’s interpretation of Buckman and held that the Texas tort 
reform law, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §82.007(b)(1), is 
preempted unless the FDA itself has found fraud.  Id. at 380. 
 
CRIMINAL MATTERS 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) 
Limitations Period – Claim of Actual Innocence: Rivas v. Fischer, 687 
F.3d 514 (2d Cir. 2012) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether an equitable remedy for actual 
innocence exists to defeat the AEDPA’s, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), 1-year 
limitations period.  Id. at 548–49.  The 2nd Circuit disagreed with the 
reasoning of the 1st, 5th, and 7th Circuits, which held that because the 
statute identifies specific exceptions to the limitations period, Congress 
did not intend for courts to apply an additional actual-innocence 
exception.  Id. at 548.  The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 6th, 9th, 10th, 
and 11th Circuits “that the Schlup actual-innocence gateway extends to 
claims otherwise barred by § 2244(d)(1).”  Id.  The court found relevant 
the fact that “no court has settled on the contrary conclusion following 
the Supreme Court’s decision on a related question in Holland v. 
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Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549(2010),” which “demonstrates that traditional 
principles of equity continue to have a place in the review of habeas 
petitions following the enactment of AEDPA.”  Id. at 549.  Thus, the 2nd 
Circuit concluded that, “absent a clear congressional command to the 
contrary, . . .  the preexisting equitable authority of federal courts to hear 
barred claims if they are accompanied by a compelling showing of actual 
innocence survives the enactment of the AEDPA and applies to claims 
otherwise barred by its statute of limitations, § 2244(d)(1).”  Id. at 551. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) – Transfer of Seized Firearms to Third-
Parties: United States v. Zaleski, 686 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2012) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether a district court may, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), order the transfer of seized, 
lawfully-owned firearms to a third-party so that they may be resold for 
the financial benefit of a criminal defendant, even “after the defendant 
becomes a convicted felon unable to possess a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g).”  Id. at 91.  The court observed that Rule 41(g) allows a person to 
“move for the [seized] property’s return[,]” and “[i]f it grants the motion, 
the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose 
reasonable conditions to protect access to the property . . . .”  Id. at 92.  
The court noted that the 11th and 8th Circuits have held that a transfer of 
firearms for the benefit of a convicted felon under 41(g) is not 
permissible, as it necessarily constitutes constructive possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Id. at 
92–93.  The court also recognized that the 7th and 5th Circuits have 
“suggested that a convicted felon may devise an arrangement in which he 
recovers the value of the seized firearms without contravening Section 
922(g)(1).”  Id. at 93.  The 2nd Circuit was persuaded by the 7th and 5th 
Circuits reasoning that a 41(g) transfer of seized firearms for the benefit 
of a convicted felon does not necessarily constitute constructive 
possession if the district court ordering the transfer provides sufficient 
safeguards to “in fact strip [the defendant] of any power to exercise 
dominion and control over them.”  Id. at *9.  Thus, the 2nd Circuit held 
that the district court was authorized to order the transfer of seized, 
lawfully-owned firearms to a third-party for the financial benefit of a 
convicted felon without contravening Section 922(g). 
 
Habeas Corpus – Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA): Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514 (2nd Cir. 2012) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed “whether a gateway claim of actual 
innocence may also excuse an untimely filing under AEDPA’s limitation 
period.”  Id. at 539.  The court noted that the 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th 
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Circuits determined that “a compelling claim of actual innocence 
constitutes an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitations period[,]” 
while the 1st, 5th and 7th Circuits found that “no such exception exists.”  
Id. at 548.  The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th 
Circuits by finding “more persuasive the reasoning expressed in the cases 
holding that an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitations period exists 
for compelling claims of actual innocence.”  Id.  The court reasoned that, 
“because § 2244(d) is not jurisdictional, it does not set forth an inflexible 
rule requiring dismissal whenever its clock has run.”  Id. at 549 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).  Additionally, the court indicated 
that, traditionally, the habeas courts have “equitable discretion to see that 
federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent 
persons.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the 2nd Circuit 
concluded “that the preexisting equitable authority of federal courts to 
hear barred claims if they are accompanied by a compelling showing of 
actual innocence survives the enactment of AEDPA and applies to claims 
otherwise barred by its statute of limitations.”  Id. at 551. 
 
Subsequent Search – Foregone Conclusion: United States v. Davis, 
690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012) 
The 4th Circuit held that a subsequent search of defendant’s seized 
bag was warranted as it was a “foregone conclusion” that the bag 
contained clothing that was evidence of a crime.  Id. at 232.  In reaching 
this decision, the majority relied on 4th Circuit precedent in finding that 
an officer’s experience is relevant to determining whether the contents of 
a bag are a “foregone conclusion.”  Id. at 235–36.  The dissent, however, 
identifies that there is a circuit split as to the exact scope of the “foregone 
conclusion” inquiry.  Id. at 270 n.13 (Davis, C.J., dissenting).  “The 
constitutionality of this corollary to the plain view seizure doctrine is 
widely accepted, but there seems to be a circuit split with respect to 
whether the ‘foregone conclusion’ analysis incorporates extrinsic 
evidence and/or an officer’s specialized knowledge.”  Id.  The dissent 
explains that the 1st, 5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have “instead analyzed 
the question from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable layperson.”  Id. 
 
Standard of Review – Plain Error Test: United States v. Escalante-
Reyes, 689 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2012) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether, when the law at the time of 
trial or plea is unsettled, but becomes clear while the case is pending on 
appeal, review for the second prong of the ‘plain error’ test properly 
considers the law as it stood during the district court proceedings (‘time 
of trial’) or at the time of the appellate court’s decision (‘time of 
152 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:40 
appeal’).”  Id. at 418 (footnote omitted).  The court noted that the 1st, 
2nd, 10th, and 11th Circuits determined “the plainness of error is 
evaluated at the time of appellate review when the law is unsettled at the 
time of trial but becomes clear by the time of appeal[,]” while the 9th and 
D.C. Circuits found “that if the law is unclear at the time of trial and later 
becomes clear, the error is evaluated based on the law as it existed at the 
time of trial.”  Id. at 421.  The 3rd, 6th, 7th, and 8th Circuits stated “that 
they would evaluate the plainness of error at the time of appeal, although 
[the] circuits have not expressly decided the issue of whether this 
principle applies when the error is unclear at the time of trial.”  Id.  The 
5th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 10th, and 11th Circuits in finding 
that “the purpose of plain error review in the first place is so that justice 
may be done . . .” and the time of appeal test is fairer and “more 
practical.”  Id. at 422.  The court disagreed with the 9th and the D.C. 
Circuits because “establishing a ‘time of appeal’ rule would not 
significantly alter trial counsel’s incentive to object.”  Id.  Thus, the 5th 
Circuit concluded that the time of appeal rule “presents the better-
reasoned view.”   Id. 
 
Failure to Instruct – Lesser Offenses: United States v. Lapointe, 690 
F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2012) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a defendant is entitled to a jury 
instruction for the lesser-included offense of conspiracy to possess a 
controlled substance where “the elements of the lesser offense are 
identical to part of the elements of the greater offense[,] . . . [and] the 
evidence would support a conviction on the lesser offense.”  Id. at 439.  
The court noted that the 10th Circuit determined that a defendant charged 
with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and who seeks a 
lesser-included offense jury instruction for conspiracy to possess, “must 
demonstrate with separate evidence a separate group conspiring only to 
possess contraband.”  Id. at 441.  The court further noted that the 1st 
Circuit disagreed with this determination, and found instead that a 
defendant’s being entitled to a lesser-included defense instruction 
depends only on “whether there is some core of facts that is common to 
the scenario that the government sought to prove and the one that the 
defendant claims to show only a lesser included offense.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 1st Circuit, 
finding that “a defendant may be convicted, with the same body of 
evidence, of joining the conspiracy as to all or merely some subset of the 
conspiracy’s objectives.”  Id. at 442.  The 6th Circuit disagreed with the 
10th Circuit’s requirement that there must be evidence of a group 
conspiring exclusively to commit a lesser offense since “it is well-
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established that a single conspiracy may have multiple objectives, 
including the violation of several criminal laws.”  Id. at 441.  Thus, the 
6th Circuit concluded that a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included 
offense instruction where there is a “core of facts that is common to the 
scenario that the government sought to prove and the one that the 
defendant claims to show only a lesser included offense.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Failure to File an Appeal: 
Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2012). 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether an “attorney’s failure to file a 
requested notice of appeal” when the defendant partially waived the right 
to appeal his conviction and sentence constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Id. at 355, 356.  The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 
10th, and 11th Circuits and a previous unpublished decision in the 6th 
Circuit determined that “if counsel had ignored the defendant’s express 
instruction to file an appeal, such action amounts to a per se violation of 
the Sixth Amendment,” while the 3rd and 7th circuits have found 
differently.  Id. at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s reasoning that where a defendant has 
made valid waiver of his right to appeal, counsel may ignore his client’s 
desire to appeal in order to retain the benefit of a plea bargain, unless 
there is a non-frivolous appealable issue.  Id.  The court also disagreed 
with the 3rd Circuit’s holding that waiver is the threshold issue of 
whether a defendant can bring an ineffective-assistance claim when 
counsel does not appeal after defendant waives appellate rights in a pleas 
agreement, and only an informed voluntary waiver is valid to prevent an 
ineffective-assistance claim.  Id.  The 6th Circuit stated that the outcome 
in the majority of circuits as well as its own unpublished decisions, “is 
the more faithful application of both [United States] Supreme Court and 
Sixth Circuit precedent” to the issue.  Id.  The 6th Circuit reasoned that it 
is the “defendant’s decision to pursue an appeal, even if that right has 
been severely limited and the outlook on the merits is bleak.”  Id. at 359–
60.  Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded “that even when a defendant waives 
all or most of his right to appeal, an attorney who fails to file an appeal 
that a criminal defendant explicitly requests has, as a matter of law, 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel that entitles the defendant to 
relief in the form of a delayed appeal.”  Id. at 360. 
 
Habeas Corpus – Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996: Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012) 
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The 9th Circuit addressed whether a petitioner must obtain leave 
from a federal appellate court in order to file a “second or successive” 
habeas corpus petition with the district court as required by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 
when the “second or successive” petition is the first petition challenging 
an amended judgment of conviction.  Id. at 1126–27.  The court noted 
that the 2nd Circuit determined that a subsequent petition is not 
successive “where a first habeas petition results in an amended 
judgment,” even if its claims could have been raised in a prior petition or 
the petitioner “effectively challenges an unamended component of the 
judgment.”  Id. at 1127.  The 5th Circuit found such a petition successive 
where it “involved the vacation of a conviction and sentence for a lesser 
included offense,” which under 5th Circuit practice left the conviction 
and sentence intact and did not involve a new, amended judgment.  Id.  
The 9th Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit in finding that procedural 
default rules, and not the rules governing “second or successive” 
petitions, are “the more appropriate tools for sorting out new claims from 
the old.”  Id.  The court stated that the 2nd Circuit practice aligns with 
existing law in the 9th Circuit: “In the context of finality, we treat the 
judgment of conviction as one unit, rather than separately considering the 
judgment’s components, i.e., treating the conviction and sentence for 
each count separately.”  Id. at 1127–28.  Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded 
that the latter of two habeas petitions is not “second or successive under 
the AEDPA because it challenges a new, intervening judgment.”  Id. at 
1128. 
 
Statute of Limitations – Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDPA): Marciesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether, under the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.S 
§  2244(d)(1), the court should apply a one-year statute of limitations on 
a claim-by-claim basis, or whether to consider the habeas petition as a 
whole.  Id. at 1169.  The court noted that the 11th Circuit held that an 
“application is timely so long as one claim within the application is 
timely.”  Id.  Conversely, the 3rd Circuit held that the “AEDPA’s statute 
of limitations should be applied to each individual claim in a habeas 
petition.”  Id. at 1170.  The 3rd Circuit noted that the language of 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations was ambiguous, so it considered the 
statute as a whole in determining that the statute of limitations should be 
applied on a claim by claim basis.  Id.  The 6th Circuit subsequently 
adopted the 3rd Circuit’s interpretation of AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations.  Id.  In addition, the 9th Circuit noted that it had previously 
adopted the 3rd Circuit’s interpretation in a case later vacated on other 
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grounds.  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit joined the 3rd and 6th Circuits in 
concluding  “that AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations applies to 
each claim in a habeas application on an individual basis.”  Id. at 1171. 
 
Privacy Rights – Freedom of Information Act: World Publishing Co. 
v. U.S. Department of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether booking photos are exempt 
from disclosure based on Exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(7)C).  Id. at 828.  The 6th Circuit 
determined that “there is no privacy interest in a booking photo given 
ongoing and public criminal proceeding” and consequently, Exemption 
7(C) is not applicable.  Id.  Alternatively, the 11th Circuit determined 
that booking photos are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 
7(C), noting that “mug shots carry a clear implication of criminal 
activity.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  The court agreed with the 11th 
Circuit’s finding that booking photographs are not generally available 
which supports a personal privacy interest in the photographs.  Id. at 829.  
Thus, the 10th Circuit held there is a privacy interest in booking photos 
and Exemption 7(C) prevents their disclosure.  Id. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
Standard of Review – Sentencing: United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 
232 (5th Cir. 2012) 
The 5th Circuit addressed the proper standard of review of abuse-
of-trust sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, evaluating 
“whether adjustments under Section 3 of the Guidelines are questions of 
law reviewed de novo or questions of fact reviewed for clear error.”  Id. 
at 251.  The court noted that the 1st Circuit determined that, since it is 
both a legal and factual question, the court should apply “a sliding scale 
of review depending on whether the trial judge’s conclusion is more law-
oriented or more fact-driven,” while the 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, and 11th 
Circuits “review the application of the Guidelines de novo and the 
district court’s factual findings for clear error.”  Id. at 252.  The 2nd and 
3rd Circuits review the question of whether the defendant occupied a 
position of trust de novo, but review the factual question of abuse of trust 
for clear error.  Id.  Finally, the D.C. Circuit found that “due deference is 
the appropriate standard of review.”  Id.  The 5th Circuit agreed with the 
D.C. Circuit in finding that due deference “reflects an apparent 
congressional desire to compromise between the need for uniformity in 
sentencing and the recognition that the district courts should be afforded 
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some flexibility in applying the guidelines to the facts before them.”  Id.  
The court disagreed with the other circuits, stating that their “scattershot 
approach” threatens uniformity in sentencing.  Id.  Thus, the 5th Circuit 
concluded that due deference is the appropriate standard of review in the 
application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 guidelines for abuse-of-trust sentencing 
enhancements.  Id. 
SENTENCING 
Prior Convictions – Applicability of the Modified Categorical 
Approach: United States v. Beardsley, 691 F.3d (2d Cir. 2012) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether § 2252A(b)(1), “which applies 
to defendants convicted of certain federal child pornography offenses 
who have a prior conviction under the laws of any State relating to 
aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive conduct involving a 
minor or ward . . . . permits a modified categorical analysis of a prior 
state conviction.”  Id. at 254, 259 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The court noted that the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits “all 
take the view that only statutes of prior conviction that are divisible into 
qualifying and non-qualifying predicate offenses may be subject to 
modified categorical analysis.”  Id. at 266.  The 2nd Circuit deemed the 
6th and 10th Circuits’ approaches unclear, and noted that the D.C. 
Circuit has not addressed the issue.  Id. at 266–67.  The court also noted 
that the 9th Circuit rejected the requirement of differentiating between 
divisible and non-divisible statutes, extending the scope of modified 
categorical questions.  Id.  The 2nd Circuit joined the majority of the 
circuits and held that the application of the modified categorical 
approach requires that a “conviction . . . [be] divisible into predicate and 
non-predicate offenses, listed in separate subsections or a disjunctive 
list.”  Id. at *46. 
 
Sentence Enhancement – Crime of Violence: United States v. Gomez, 
690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2012) 
The 4th Circuit addressed whether district courts “may apply the 
modified categorical approach under the [Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA)],” to determine “if a prior conviction was a crime of violence 
for [sentence] enhancement purposes.”  Id. at 199, 202.  The 4th Circuit 
noted from its own precedent that the “use of the modified categorical 
approach is only appropriate when the statute of conviction encompasses 
multiple distinct categories of behavior, and at least one of those 
categories constitutes an ACCA violent felony.”  Id. at 199 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court observed that the majority of 
circuits to consider the issue hold that where there is no divisible use-of-
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force element under the applicable statute, the district courts may not 
employ the modified categorical approach to determine that the use of 
force in question was a crime of violence.  Id. at 199–00.  Meanwhile, 
the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuit apply “the modified categorical approach to 
both divisible and indivisible statutes.”  Id. at 204 n.1.  The 4th Circuit 
agreed with the majority of circuits based on an understanding of its own 
precedent and its reading of Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at 203.  Thus, 
the 4th Circuit held that “district courts may apply the modified 
categorical approach to a statute only if it contains divisible categories of 
proscribed conduct, at least one of which constitutes—by its elements—a 
violent felony.”  Id. at 199. 
 
Crimes of Violence – Sentencing and Punishment: United States v. 
Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2012) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “aggravated assault” under N.M. 
Stat. § 30-3-2(A) qualifies as a crime of violence under the element 
prong of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.  Id. at 558.  The court noted that the 5th, 9th, 
and 10th Circuits have held that “even a general-intent crime may 
include the threatened use of physical force as an element if it includes 
the use of a deadly weapon as an element.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit 
disagreed with this conclusion and instead found that “[n]ot every crime 
becomes a crime of violence when committed with a deadly weapon.”  
Id.  The 6th Circuit further explained that “[t]he use of a deadly weapon 
may exacerbate the threat of physical force, but does not necessarily 
supply the threat if it is not already present in the underlying crime.”  Id.  
Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that the “broad definition of assault . . . 
obstructs any argument that New Mexico aggravated assault (deadly 
weapon) qualifies as a crime of violence.”  Id. 
  

